Written authorization
Documented permission from the appropriate owner or authority for a defined cybersecurity purpose, scope, time, method, and responsibility structure.
High School AdvancedModule A1Lesson 2 of 10Authorization and Scope
A1.2 Authorization, Scope, and Written Permission
Learn how professional defenders turn a broad request into a precise written boundary covering purpose, assets, identities, data, actions, methods, time, ownership, approval gates, stop conditions, communication, validation, and closure.
Lesson Progress
Authorization, Scope, and Written Permission
High School Advanced • A1: Advanced Cyber Ethics and Legal Boundaries • Lesson 2 of 10
20% complete
Readiness Check
Before You Start
0/6 ready
Professional Hook
Connected Does Not Mean Authorized
A fictional analyst is authorized to review supplied sign-in logs for APP-TRAIN-01 and ID-TRAIN-01 from 9:00 AM to 1:00 PM. The application depends on DB-TRAIN-02 and supplier service EXT-DEMO-03. A supervisor asks the analyst to check the database because it is related. Professional scope discipline requires the analyst to document the dependency, verify ownership, and seek separate written authorization rather than treating architecture connections as automatic permission.
Weak interpretation
The database supports the application, so it must be included. The supervisor asked, and the analyst has access.
Professional interpretation
The database is a relevant dependency but remains out of scope until the correct owner provides written permission and defines the approved evidence, actions, time, and limits.
Objective 1
Explain why written authorization is the foundation of lawful, ethical, and professionally defensible cybersecurity work.
Objective 2
Distinguish business need, verbal requests, technical access, emergency pressure, and supervisor seniority from actual permission.
Objective 3
Define scope across systems, identities, data, actions, methods, locations, time windows, evidence handling, communication, and stop conditions.
Objective 4
Identify missing, contradictory, expired, or overly broad language in a fictional authorization document.
Objective 5
Build a portfolio-ready authorization and scope package with approvals, boundaries, escalation routes, evidence rules, validation, and closure criteria.
Why This Matters
Scope Protects Both the Organization and the Defender
Strong authorization protects fictional users, owners, systems, data, services, suppliers, evidence, and the defender performing the work. It creates a shared record of why the task exists, what may happen, what must not happen, who may decide, when work must stop, how evidence is handled, and what proves completion. Without that structure, even useful defensive work can become invasive, disruptive, inaccurate, unreviewable, or legally risky.
Prevents accidental expansion
Dependencies, connected systems, and interesting findings stay outside scope until approved.
Protects evidence and privacy
Only approved fictional records and minimum fields are viewed, stored, shared, retained, and reported.
Clarifies accountability
Recommendation, approval, execution, communication, validation, and risk acceptance are assigned to authorized roles.
Core Model
Permission Must Answer Six Questions
Why?
What fictional purpose, decision, and expected outcome justify the task?
What?
Which exact systems, identities, data, services, evidence, and environments are included?
How?
Which actions, methods, tools, controls, approvals, and prohibitions apply?
When and where?
What start, end, timezone, location, supervision, and expiration govern the work?
Who?
Who requested, owns, approves, executes, communicates, validates, reviews, and accepts residual risk?
When must work stop?
Which scope, privacy, service, evidence, authority, competence, or conflict condition triggers a pause?
Advanced Vocabulary
Language for Authorization and Scope
Scope statement
A precise description of what is included, excluded, permitted, prohibited, time-limited, evidence-limited, and owner-approved.
In-scope asset
A fictional system, service, identity, data set, application, device, network zone, or environment explicitly included in written permission.
Out-of-scope asset
Anything not explicitly approved, including connected systems, personal devices, private accounts, third-party services, unrelated data, and later time periods.
Allowed action
A specific activity the authorized defender may perform, such as reviewing supplied logs, analyzing a fictional diagram, or validating an approved configuration state.
Prohibited action
An activity not permitted by the authorization, such as live testing, scanning, accessing private messages, changing production systems, or public disclosure.
Method boundary
The approved way an action may be performed, including tools, evidence sources, environments, and safety controls.
Time window
The period during which the authorized work may occur, including start, end, timezone, review checkpoints, and expiration.
Data boundary
The exact information categories, fields, classifications, owners, retention limits, and sharing rules permitted for the task.
Delegated authority
Permission formally assigned by an authorized owner to another role, including the limits of that delegation.
Approval gate
A required checkpoint before a new action, scope expansion, disclosure, data access, or service-impacting change may proceed.
Scope expansion
A proposed change that adds systems, identities, data, actions, methods, time, suppliers, or communication beyond the current authorization.
Stop condition
A defined event that requires work to pause, such as unexpected sensitive data, unclear ownership, expired permission, service instability, or evidence-integrity concerns.
Emergency authority
A narrowly defined, documented, time-limited permission used under approved emergency procedures, not a general excuse to ignore boundaries.
Evidence-handling rule
A requirement governing what evidence may be viewed, copied, stored, shared, retained, deleted, or included in reports.
Closure criteria
The evidence, validation, owner signoff, communication, recordkeeping, and residual-risk conditions required before authorized work is complete.
Scope Dimensions
Ten Boundaries a Professional Authorization Should Define
Purpose
Include
The fictional security question, business need, expected decision, and intended outcome.
Exclude
General curiosity, unrelated improvement work, or investigation of other possible issues.
Evidence
Task request, owner statement, ticket, project brief, or incident objective.
Risk if vague
A vague purpose can justify almost any action after the fact.
Systems and services
Include
Exact fictional hostnames, applications, environments, network zones, services, and tenant or project boundaries.
Exclude
Connected systems, backups, personal devices, supplier systems, or environments not named.
Evidence
Asset inventory, architecture diagram, owner confirmation, and environment label.
Risk if vague
Connected does not mean authorized.
Identities and accounts
Include
Exact fictional user, service, administrator, supplier, test, and emergency identities that may be reviewed.
Exclude
Other users, personal accounts, shared identities, or unrelated privileged accounts.
Evidence
IAM inventory, owner confirmation, role map, and test-account plan.
Risk if vague
Reviewing unrelated identities can create privacy and trust harm.
Data and evidence
Include
Approved fictional log fields, alert records, diagrams, policy excerpts, configuration snapshots, and owner statements.
Exclude
Private messages, full mailboxes, personal files, confidential records, or unrelated evidence.
Evidence
Data classification, evidence list, data-owner approval, and minimum-necessary justification.
Risk if vague
Overcollection creates privacy, retention, and disclosure risk.
Actions
Include
Reviewing supplied evidence, documenting findings, comparing approved states, and recommending actions.
Exclude
Live access, scanning, configuration changes, account disabling, data export, or public disclosure unless explicitly approved.
Evidence
Action list, procedure, change authority, and owner approval.
Risk if vague
A general phrase like investigate does not authorize every possible action.
Methods and tools
Include
Approved fictional dashboards, provided logs, static diagrams, worksheets, or controlled training environments.
Exclude
Unapproved tools, live probes, real suspicious content, personal accounts, or uncontrolled environments.
Evidence
Method list, environment diagram, tool approval, and safety controls.
Risk if vague
An allowed goal does not automatically authorize every method.
Time and location
Include
Start, end, timezone, permitted work location, supervision, checkpoints, and expiration.
Exclude
Later work, unsupervised continuation, remote work, or after-hours access not approved.
Evidence
Authorization dates, schedule, location rule, and extension procedure.
Risk if vague
Permission can expire even when the technical task is unfinished.
Communication
Include
Who may receive technical, service, leadership, user, supplier, teacher, or portfolio updates.
Exclude
Public posts, class group chats, unrelated staff, friends, or unapproved external sharing.
Evidence
Communication plan, audience list, confidentiality rule, and disclosure owner.
Risk if vague
Authorized analysis does not automatically authorize disclosure.
Service impact
Include
Permitted disruption, maintenance windows, continuity requirements, rollback, and owner-approved thresholds.
Exclude
Broad shutdown, irreversible change, or unplanned outage.
Evidence
Service criticality, dependency map, change plan, owner approval, and rollback test.
Risk if vague
A technically correct action can still create unacceptable business harm.
Closure
Include
Required findings, action records, validation, communication, evidence handling, signoff, residual risk, and retention.
Exclude
Automatic closure when alerts stop or a ticket is marked complete.
Evidence
Closure checklist, validation results, owner signoff, and residual-risk statement.
Risk if vague
Incomplete validation can leave hidden gaps.
Authorization Roles
One Person Rarely Owns Every Permission
Task requester
Responsibility
Explains the fictional need, desired outcome, urgency, and business context.
May authorize
Only actions within the requester's formally delegated authority.
May not authorize
Systems, data, privacy access, service changes, disclosure, or supplier actions outside that delegation.
Authority evidence
Role description, delegation, ticket ownership, and approval limits.
System or service owner
Responsibility
Defines system purpose, criticality, dependencies, acceptable disruption, and approved technical boundaries.
May authorize
System-specific review or change within policy and delegated authority.
May not authorize
Unrelated data access, legal exceptions, or actions on third-party systems they do not own.
Authority evidence
Asset ownership record, service catalog, change authority, and owner confirmation.
Data owner or privacy authority
Responsibility
Defines which fictional information may be used, who may access it, minimum fields, sharing, retention, and deletion.
May authorize
Approved data use within policy and purpose.
May not authorize
Technical changes or public disclosure beyond the role's authority.
Authority evidence
Classification, privacy rule, data-use approval, and retention requirement.
Security manager or incident lead
Responsibility
Coordinates defensive scope, evidence, cases, priorities, actions, escalation, and validation.
May authorize
Security activities within the documented response plan and delegated authority.
May not authorize
Every legal, privacy, business, supplier, or public-communication decision.
Authority evidence
Incident plan, delegation, playbook, and role assignment.
Change authority
Responsibility
Reviews fictional configuration, access, service, or infrastructure changes for risk, timing, rollback, and validation.
May authorize
Approved changes within the governed process.
May not authorize
Data collection, disclosure, or investigation outside the approved change.
Authority evidence
Change record, approval, maintenance window, rollback, and test plan.
Legal, policy, or compliance owner
Responsibility
Interprets obligations, policies, contracts, disclosure rules, exceptions, and documentation requirements.
May authorize
Specialized legal or policy decisions within formal authority.
May not authorize
Technical actions or business disruption without the relevant technical and service owners.
Authority evidence
Policy, procedure, contract, exception, legal review, and approval record.
Supplier or partner owner
Responsibility
Coordinates fictional external systems, contracts, access, evidence requests, service dependencies, and communication.
May authorize
Actions permitted by the approved agreement and delegated relationship.
May not authorize
Access to supplier systems beyond the contract or without the supplier's authorization.
Authority evidence
Agreement, access record, owner contact, scope clause, and communication plan.
Risk owner or leadership
Responsibility
Selects treatment, accepts residual risk, assigns resources, and approves major business-impact decisions.
May authorize
Business risk decisions within governance and legal boundaries.
May not authorize
Unlawful, unsafe, deceptive, privacy-invasive, or technically undefined actions.
Authority evidence
Risk decision, leadership approval, owner assignment, deadline, and residual-risk acceptance.
Scope Review Workflow
Ten Steps for Reviewing Written Permission
1
Confirm the document and authority
Who issued the fictional permission, what role do they hold, and what evidence proves their authority?
Required output
Authorization source and authority record.
Red flag
The document is unsigned, copied from an old project, or approved by a role without ownership.
2
Define the exact purpose
What question must be answered, which decision will use the result, and what outcome is expected?
Required output
One-sentence purpose statement.
Red flag
The task says investigate everything or make the system secure.
3
List in-scope and out-of-scope assets
Which exact systems, services, identities, data sets, environments, suppliers, and locations are included or excluded?
Required output
Scope inventory with ownership.
Red flag
The document names one application but says related systems without defining them.
4
List allowed and prohibited actions
May the defender review, query, test, change, disable, export, contact, disclose, or only recommend?
Required output
Action-permission matrix.
Red flag
The word investigate is used without methods, limits, or approval gates.
5
Define evidence and privacy rules
Which fields may be used, who owns them, how are they stored, who may receive them, and when are they deleted?
Required output
Evidence-handling plan.
Red flag
The authorization permits all logs but gives no classification, purpose, retention, or sharing limit.
6
Set time, supervision, and location
When may work begin and end, what timezone applies, where may it occur, and who must supervise?
Required output
Authorized schedule and location record.
Red flag
The date is expired or no end time exists.
7
Define approval gates and stop conditions
What requires additional approval, and which unexpected events require immediate pause or escalation?
Required output
Gate and stop-condition table.
Red flag
There is no process for unexpected data, service instability, scope expansion, or evidence-integrity problems.
8
Define communication and disclosure
Who may receive findings, who approves user or supplier contact, and what may enter a portfolio?
Required output
Audience and disclosure map.
Red flag
The defender may share results as needed without defining recipients or confidentiality.
9
Define action and rollback authority
Who may approve and execute changes, what service impact is acceptable, and how will rollback work?
Required output
Change and continuity plan.
Red flag
The analyst may take necessary action without owner review.
10
Define validation and closure
What proves success, who signs off, what remains monitored, and how is residual risk documented?
Required output
Validation and closure checklist.
Red flag
Closure occurs when the alert disappears.
Authorization Document Quality
Strong Language versus Dangerous Ambiguity
Authorized purpose
Strong example
Determine whether the fictional service-account sign-in alert matches expected behavior using supplied records.
Weak example
Investigate suspicious activity.
Why it matters
A narrow purpose limits unrelated collection and actions.
Authorized assets
Strong example
APP-TRAIN-01 and ID-TRAIN-01 only.
Weak example
The application and related systems.
Why it matters
Exact asset names prevent accidental expansion to dependencies.
Authorized evidence
Strong example
Supplied sign-in, service-health, and owner-confirmation records listed in Appendix A.
Weak example
Any useful logs or messages.
Why it matters
Evidence categories need purpose, ownership, and privacy controls.
Allowed actions
Strong example
Review supplied evidence, compare baseline, document findings, and recommend owner-approved next steps.
Weak example
Take necessary security action.
Why it matters
Action verbs must be explicit.
Prohibited actions
Strong example
No live access, scanning, account disabling, configuration changes, private-message review, data export, or public disclosure.
Weak example
Use good judgment.
Why it matters
Prohibitions make boundaries reviewable and enforceable.
Time and location
Strong example
9:00 AM–1:00 PM Eastern Time in the supervised fictional training environment.
Weak example
Complete today.
Why it matters
Time, timezone, environment, and supervision should be explicit.
Approval gates
Strong example
New assets, new data types, live actions, supplier contact, and service-impacting changes require written approval.
Weak example
Ask when needed.
Why it matters
The document should define exactly what needs further authorization.
Stop conditions
Strong example
Pause for unexpected confidential data, scope conflict, service instability, expired permission, or evidence-integrity concern.
Weak example
Stop if something goes wrong.
Why it matters
Specific conditions support safe and consistent decisions.
Communication
Strong example
Technical details to the security lead; service impact to the owner; privacy issues to the data owner; fictional portfolio summary to the teacher.
Weak example
Share results with stakeholders.
Why it matters
Audience, content, owner, and confidentiality should be defined.
Validation and closure
Strong example
Close only after evidence review, owner decision, effective-state checks, service validation, communication, evidence handling, signoff, and residual-risk record.
Weak example
Close when the alert is gone.
Why it matters
Closure should reflect validated technical and operational outcomes.
Fake Dashboard
Fake Northbridge Authorization and Scope Dashboard
Fictional permission review for training only.
Authorized assets
2
APP-TRAIN-01 and ID-TRAIN-01 are explicitly listed.
Scope conflicts
3
Database review, mailbox export, and supplier contact require separate approval.
Time remaining
42 min
Current authorization expires at 1:00 PM Eastern Time.
Fake SOC Alert
Scope Expansion Requested without Confirmed Owner Approval
Source: Fake Northbridge Authorization Review Console • Time: 12:18 PM
A fictional supervisor requests review of DB-TRAIN-02 and a full confidential mailbox export. Neither asset nor evidence category appears in the signed authorization memo.
Defensive recommendation: Pause the expanded work, document each requested change, confirm system and data ownership, define minimum-necessary evidence, obtain written approval, and update the time window and stop conditions before proceeding.
Fake Log Panel
Fake Authorization Review Timeline
training-log-viewer.log
09:00 AUTH assets='APP-TRAIN-01,ID-TRAIN-01' 09:00 AUTH evidence='supplied-sign-in-logs' 09:00 AUTH actions='review,document,recommend' 09:00 AUTH window='09:00-13:00 ET' 10:05 DEPENDENCY asset='DB-TRAIN-02' 10:06 SCOPE database='not-listed' 10:15 REQUEST database-review='supervisor' 10:17 OWNER database='unconfirmed' 11:05 REQUEST mailbox-export='full' 11:06 DATA mailbox='confidential' 11:07 SCOPE mailbox='not-approved' 11:10 DECISION expanded-work='paused' 11:20 OPTION auth-fields-only='available' 12:00 REQUEST supplier-contact='proposed' 12:01 DISCLOSURE supplier='not-approved' 12:18 ESCALATION scope-expansion='requested'
Training note: this is fake data for defensive analysis practice only.
Fictional Evidence Matrix
What the Authorization Evidence Supports
AUTH-01
Fictional signed authorization memo
Observation
Approves review of APP-TRAIN-01 and ID-TRAIN-01 using supplied logs from 9:00 AM to 1:00 PM.
Supports
Two assets, one evidence method, and one time window are authorized.
Does not prove
Does not authorize live access, connected systems, private messages, configuration changes, or later work.
Professional action
Use as the primary boundary and pause any request outside it.
AUTH-02
Fictional project ticket
Observation
States the purpose is to determine whether a training sign-in alert matches expected service-account behavior.
Supports
The approved question is narrow and identity-focused.
Does not prove
Does not authorize a broad search for unrelated weaknesses.
Professional action
Keep evidence collection tied to the stated question.
AUTH-03
Fictional asset inventory
Observation
Shows APP-TRAIN-01 depends on DB-TRAIN-02 and supplier service EXT-DEMO-03.
Supports
Dependencies exist and may affect service interpretation.
Does not prove
Does not place the database or supplier service inside scope.
Professional action
Document dependencies but seek separate permission before reviewing them.
AUTH-04
Fictional supervisor message
Observation
Requests review of DB-TRAIN-02 because it is connected to the approved application.
Supports
A scope-expansion request exists.
Does not prove
Does not prove the supervisor owns the database or may expand scope.
Professional action
Pause database review and route the request to the database owner and security lead.
AUTH-05
Fictional data-classification sheet
Observation
Authentication logs are internal; mailbox content is confidential and needs data-owner approval.
Supports
Different evidence categories require different controls.
Does not prove
Does not decide whether mailbox content is necessary.
Professional action
Use approved authentication fields and avoid mailbox access.
AUTH-06
Fictional schedule record
Observation
The review window ends at 1:00 PM in Eastern Time.
Supports
Authorization expires at a defined time.
Does not prove
Does not permit continuation if the task is incomplete.
Professional action
Stop at expiration or obtain documented extension before continuing.
AUTH-07
Fictional change policy
Observation
Only the change owner may approve account disabling or configuration changes.
Supports
The analyst may recommend but not execute those actions.
Does not prove
Does not prove a change is necessary.
Professional action
Prepare evidence-based options for the authorized change owner.
AUTH-08
Fictional disclosure rule
Observation
Findings may be shared only with the security lead, service owner, privacy reviewer, and assigned teacher.
Supports
A limited audience is approved.
Does not prove
Does not authorize class-wide, public, social-media, or supplier disclosure.
Professional action
Use the approved audience map and fully fictionalize the portfolio version.
Analyze the Evidence
May the Fictional Analyst Review the Database?
The signed authorization names APP-TRAIN-01 and ID-TRAIN-01 only.
DB-TRAIN-02 is a dependency but is not listed as an authorized asset.
A supervisor requested database review.
Database ownership and delegated authority are unconfirmed.
The current permission allows supplied-log review, documentation, and recommendation only.
The authorization window ends at 1:00 PM Eastern Time.
May the Fictional Analyst Review the Database?
Common Scope Mistakes
Patterns That Turn a Legitimate Task into Unauthorized Work
Assuming a verbal request from a senior person automatically overrides written boundaries.
Treating technical access, administrator rights, or tool capability as permission.
Interpreting connected, related, supporting, or dependent systems as automatically in scope.
Using the word investigate as permission for any method or evidence source.
Allowing authorization to continue after its time window expires.
Collecting full records when only a few approved fields are needed.
Failing to name prohibited actions because they seem obvious.
Using old authorization documents for a new project, system, owner, or time period.
Allowing one owner to approve actions that belong to another owner, such as private data access or supplier testing.
Making a live or service-impacting change when the authorization permits review and recommendation only.
Sharing findings with unapproved audiences because the information seems educational or helpful.
Treating an emergency as unlimited permission instead of using narrow documented emergency authority.
Failing to define stop conditions for unexpected sensitive data, unstable service, scope conflict, or evidence damage.
Closing work when the ticket is complete rather than when required validation and signoff are complete.
Safe Practice Lab
Build a Fictional Authorization and Scope Package
Fictional assignment
Rewrite the Northbridge Authorization
Use only the invented evidence on this page. Do not upload, copy, lightly edit, or summarize a real authorization letter, policy, contract, incident plan, scope statement, system record, private message, or confidential document.
Required deliverables
- Authorized purpose and decision question.
- In-scope and out-of-scope asset inventory.
- Identity, data, evidence, action, method, time, and location boundaries.
- Authorization-role and ownership map.
- Allowed and prohibited action matrix.
- Approval gates and scope-expansion procedure.
- Stop conditions and emergency-authority limits.
- Communication, disclosure, retention, and portfolio rules.
- Validation and closure checklist.
- Reflection and revision history after fictional reviewer feedback.
The finished artifact must remain fully fictional and may never be used as permission to access, test, scan, alter, bypass, investigate, or disclose any real system, account, data, network, application, organization, person, or supplier.
Scenario Decision Lab
The Authorization Expires in Ten Minutes
The fictional review is incomplete, but the written authorization ends at 1:00 PM. The analyst believes another hour would probably finish the work.
Scenario Decision Lab
An Emergency Request Says to Disable the Account
A fictional manager requests immediate account disabling after one High alert. The current authorization permits review and recommendation only, and the account supports an important service.
Defender Habits
Authorization and Scope Checklist
Check Your Understanding
A1.2 Mini Quiz: Authorization, Scope, and Written Permission
Choose your answers first. Explanations appear only after submission.
1. What best distinguishes written authorization from a verbal request?
2. A fictional application depends on a database that is not named in the authorization. What is strongest?
3. Which phrase creates the weakest fictional action boundary?
4. What should happen when a fictional authorization window expires before the review is complete?
5. Why should fictional stop conditions be specific?
6. A fictional analyst is authorized to review logs and recommend actions. May the analyst disable an account?
7. What makes an authorization portfolio artifact safe to share?
Portfolio Prompt
Portfolio Prompt
Create a fully fictional Authorization, Scope, and Written Permission Package for the Northbridge training review. Include the authorized purpose, issuing authority, role delegation, exact in-scope and out-of-scope assets, identities, data, evidence, actions, methods, tools, locations, time window, supervision, allowed and prohibited actions, evidence-handling rules, approval gates, stop conditions, emergency limits, communication audiences, disclosure rules, scope-expansion process, rollback, validation, closure, residual risk, reviewer feedback, revision history, and portfolio-safety statement.
Use precise fictional names and identifiers instead of vague phrases such as related systems or necessary action.
Show that connected systems and dependencies remain out of scope until separately approved.
Separate the requester, system owner, data owner, security lead, change authority, privacy reviewer, supplier owner, and risk owner.
Include at least one missing or ambiguous clause, revise it after feedback, and explain why the revision creates a safer boundary.
State clearly that the artifact is fictional and provides no real-world authorization.
Key Takeaways
What You Should Remember
1.Written authorization turns a broad request into an accountable professional boundary.
2.Technical access, skill, urgency, business pressure, seniority, good intentions, and connected architecture do not automatically create permission.
3.Scope should define purpose, assets, identities, data, evidence, actions, methods, tools, time, location, ownership, communication, service impact, validation, and closure.
4.In-scope and out-of-scope lists should be explicit because related, dependent, or connected systems are not automatically authorized.
5.Review, recommendation, approval, execution, communication, validation, and risk acceptance belong to different roles.
6.Scope expansion requires a documented request, correct owner, updated boundaries, approvals, time, evidence rules, and stop conditions.
7.Emergency authority should remain narrow, time-limited, documented, reversible, owner-aware, and reviewable.
8.Authorization can expire before a task is complete, and work must pause until a documented extension exists.
9.Authorized analysis does not automatically authorize data access, service changes, supplier contact, user notification, public disclosure, or portfolio sharing.
10.Every CyberShield authorization artifact must remain fully fictional, defensive, privacy-safe, and incapable of granting real-world permission.
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